The investigation shows how the sanctioned plant supplies polyamide to Russia while exporting its products to the EU by masking their origin through front companies

The Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC) prepared this piece in partnership with the Belarusian activist group Rabochy Ruch and with the support of the hacktivist group Cyber Partisans, who helped obtain data on the persons involved in the investigation.

Body armor for the Russians

A Russian soldier runs across a field to hide among some leafless trees. He is wearing neither a helmet nor body armor. Such a video was published by The Telegraph at the end of November. One of the points of the article was the shortage of combat equipment the Russian soldiers experience in the war against Ukraine. 

Body armor is officially a standard part of a Russian soldier’s combat equipment. However, the Ukrainian military regularly records Russians fighting without personal armor. 

Military and political observer of the Ukrainian Information Resistance group Alexander Kovalenko told BIC that recently almost 700,000 Russian soldiers have been fighting in the combat zone. The same figure was cited by the Russian ruler Vladimir Putin in September 2025. They all need to be equipped, but the Russian state probably does not have the capacity to provide for everyone.

“Every month they (the Russian armed forces — ed.) receive approximately thirty thousand more [soldiers]. This compensates for losses [at the front], but they also need to be dressed in something, they need to be provided with equipment. And that is why Russia turns to other countries,” Kovalenko explained.

BIC journalists found out that Belarus is one of the countries that help the Russian Federation with raw materials for the production of body armor.

Supplying the Russian military industry

Polyamide fibers can be found in a wide variety of things: from swimsuits and carpets to cables and car parts. They are also used in military production -- for example, in the fabric of bulletproof vests, into which protective plates made of Kevlar, ceramics, metal and other materials are inserted.

In Belarus, the state enterprise Grodno Azot produces polyamide as well as related fibers and yarn. The company also operates a branch called Khimvolokno Plant – both facilities are based in the city of Grodno in western Belarus. The documentation of the marketing department of the Khimvolokno Plant shows that in 2022, the plant held an almost monopolistic position in supplying  polyamide technical yarn to Russia from the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). [*] By the time of this investigation, some competitors from Armenia and Kazakhstan had emerged, but Belarusian supplies still held  the largest share of the Russian market.

Some of the buyers from Grodno Azot are connected to the Russian military industrу. One of them is the JSC "VNIISV" based in Tver. The company was mentioned in the list of Russian “strategic organizations” and was involved in the development of military materials. From 2023 to April 2025, the Khimvolokno Plant supplied six batches of polyamide to the JSC "VNIISV", totaling 18 tons.

Chemist and pharmacist Siarhei Besarab told the BIC that such batches were a lot for a research enterprise: "I believe this is not just research and development, this is research and development with some kind of small-scale production".

Another client is AO "ZAVOD TRUD", based in Nizhny Novgorod. It cooperates with the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, as well as with law enforcement agencies. From August 2022 to April 2023, the plant purchased dozens of tons of Belarusian raw materials worth almost $370,000.

Much of the Khimvolokno Plant exports to Russia goes to the Russian "Belneftekhim-Ros" Company Limited. It serves as a distribution arm of the Belarusian State Concern for Oil and Chemistry (Belneftekhim Concern), of which Grodno Azot is a part. This dealer of the Belarusian chemical concern had close ties with the Russian Ministry of Defense. In one of its previous investigations the BIC reported that in 2022 and 2023 Belneftekhim-Ros signed several contracts with the Ministry for about $20 million.

In total, from 2022 through July 2025, Russian enterprises received thousands of tons of Belarusian polyamide yarn worth about $48 million, while shipments of pure polyamide were valued at approximately $60 million.

Breaking the sanctions: Sales to the EU

The United States first imposed financial sanctions on Belarus in 2006 over human rights violations. In 2011, Grodno Azot also fell under these restrictions. In 2015, the measures were suspended, but in 2021 U.S. citizens and American companies were again barred from carrying out any transactions with the enterprise. The reasons cited were repression against civil society.

At the end of 2021, the European Union also imposed sanctions on Grodno Azot, yet the Khimvolokno Plant continues to supply its products to EU countries. 

To circumvent the sanctions, front companies are used. One of them is TAA Groniti. It was established in February 2021, two months before the US reimposed its sanctions on Grodno Azot. [*]  The company manufactures rope and cable products.

The role of TAA Groniti in supplying  prohibited products to the EU is confirmed by a document obtained by the BIC. The company signed contract No.454 with Grodno Azot in August 2021 “for the export from Belarus in full” of polyamide yarn for almost €650,000. [*] [*] [*] This document was subsequently updated to expand the list of products for export. [*]

The sanctioned state enterprise gave official permission to change the declared origin of its goods when selling them to the European Union. The BIC learned about this from correspondence between representatives of both companies. At the end of November 2021 - two days before the European sanctions were imposed on Grodno Azot - the acting deputy director of the Khimvolokno Plant Fiodar Sarokin, wrote to the TAA Groniti director Hanna Labachova. He stated that there were no objections to the scenario in which "when processing the export customs declaration on behalf of TAA Groniti, TAA Groniti would be indicated as the manufacturer." This agreement was to apply to deliveries of the Khimvolokno Plant products to Lithuania. [*]

From official correspondence in 2022 and 2023, BIC learned that representatives of Khimvolokno Plant had asked TAA Groniti’s management to help sell their products. In these communications they explained that Khimvolokno Plant  could not receive payments from Brazil, Turkey and China (these countries did not impose restrictions on the Belarusian company, but could fear secondary sanctions from the US). [*] [*] [*]

From August 2021 through the end of November 2022, the state-owned enterprise signed contracts to sell its products through TAA Groniti worth nearly €15 million. [*] The plant even prepared a presentation detailing schemes to supply goods to Italy, Serbia and Slovakia, through TAA Groniti, bypassing sanctions. [*] [*] [*] [*]

Since the beginning of 2023, more than 300 batches of sanctioned goods have been shipped through this front company to Italy and more than 300 to Latvia, and another 142 batches to Poland. The scheme is still operating this year.

BIC journalists tried to reach Hanna Labachova, director of TAA Groniti, by phone, but she did not answer.

Breaking more sanctions: Sales to Iran

TAA Groniti official documents also list Aliaksei Karastsialiou as the Deputy Director for Commercial Affairs. [*] He also owns the company TAA Ar-bel Commodities that helps Grodno Azot circumvent sanctions. [*] [*] In August 2025, Ar-bel Commodities signed a €2 million contract with a Turkish company for the supply of polyamide products. [*] The BIC found out that the real producer was Grodno Azot, the Belarusian enterprise under sanctions. 

At the buyer’s request, companies in other countries can be designated as recipients of the shipment. For example, one  batch of nylon threads was routed to a Polish company with an unloading address in Białystok. In other words, while a company in Turkey (which had not imposed sanctions) officially purchased the goods, they were actually shipped to an EU destination. [*] [*] [*] 

In addition, Karastsialiou helped the Khimvolokno Plant supply nylon to Iran, a country under US sanctions. In an early 2023 letter to a representative of the Iranian company Pars Tire Co, Karastsialiou wrote: “Dear Arman, It’s Alex from Groniti Ltd, Belarus. We are producer of nylon yarns, twisted yarns, ropes and cords from Belarus.  We can offer you deliveries of nylon yarns. Payments can go through Singapur company and deliveries directly from Belarus.”

The parties agreed on the supply of yarn from Grodno Azot. The formal seller was the Singaporean company True Energy PTE. LTD. However, the goods were shipped from the address in Belarus where a similarly named company TAA Sapraudnaja enerhija (in English True Energy LLC), is registered alongside TAA Ar-bel Commodities, both of which are owned by Karastsialiou. [*] [*]

On paper, the goods were purchased by a company registered in the United Arab Emirates, but the delivery address is in Tehran. [*]

Some foreign clients might not realize they’re buying products originating from the sanctioned Grodno Azot. However, chemist and pharmacist Siarhei Besarab believes this is unlikely:

"Any person with minimal common sense will understand that nylon (nylon granules) is not the kind of product that you can buy on [some online market like] OLX or Allegro. Because there are only a few large manufacturers known all over the world. And all this granulated polyamide comes from one of these manufacturers," he said.

The BIC attempts to reach Karastsialiou by phone for a comment were unsuccessful. BIC journalists also sent a written request to him and other persons involved in the investigation. We had not received any answers by the time of this publication.

Available evidence indicates that the state-owned enterprise Grodno Azot has continued to profit from the war in Ukraine by supplying materials to companies linked to Russia’s military-industrial sector. At the same time, Grodno Azot has maintained exports to the European Union through intermediary companies. Documents obtained by the BIC – including contracts and internal correspondence – show that this is not an isolated instance of sanctions evasion, but a well-established scheme that has operated for years. Sanctions imposed on Grodno Azot for its involvement in the repression of civil society have failed to stop the trade, forcing it instead onto new routes.