According to the former law enforcement officials, the Belarusian people are being watched by several structures at once. Among them is the Department of operational investigative activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB has a similar unit of its own. The Operative Analytical Centre under the President and Lukashenka's Security Service are also involved. Both ordinary Belarusians and officials are tracked. Recordings of these conversations are published regularly by cyberpartisans. Pavel Latushka, former Minister of Culture and head of the NAU, also spoke about this:

First of all, as a minister, I met with representatives of the intelligence services. And I was told that 6 intelligence services of the Belarusian state institutions have the right to wiretap phone calls. I remember that at that time, it was about purchasing special rather expensive (20 million dollars) equipment, which made it possible to actually wiretap quite large, significant areas. Mobile operators were also used. I remember that Lukashenka himself said that he announced  during the meeting in 2010 for all phone calls to be tapped and that he eventually managed to cover practically the entire area and wiretap all conversations.

In fact, it is possible to wiretap all Belarusians. But practically it is difficult, as it requires a lot of human and financial resources. The trigger word can be used to find those who said it over the phone. However, it is not practical to do so. And it's likely that the Belarusian intelligence services do not wiretap everyone, but rather target specific individuals. Vital Yakushau, director of the cyber security company “10Guards” said:

For example, as it’s being done in America. There is a programme called Prizm that records all texts and calls. It is impossible to process all the information manually that’s why a special product called Palantir is used. It searches keywords, for example, bomb, terrorist, - depending on who is the threat now. Then the information is given to operators for analysis. I can say the word "bomb" in 100 different contexts. So it takes human intelligence to filter out the information. It is not technologically difficult in the first place, but very expensive. You have to store a huge amount of information and then process it. I do not know whether they do it in Belarus, or somewhere in the post-Soviet countries. They definitely do something. They selectively wiretap the opposition, criminals and political opponents.

There are several ways of wiretapping telephone calls. The easiest way is through the mobile operator. And it is almost impossible to know about it. Another way of wiretapping is through spyware on your phone. They record conversations and send them immediately to their customers. You can indirectly tell that wiretapping is happening. For example, your phone battery starts to drain faster and more traffic is lost if you don’t use the internet. A rarer variant of wiretapping is bugging. It is put into the phone physically, meaning the user's phone must fall into the hands of the intelligence services. But such a hardware bug is difficult to put in modern, thin smartphones; it's easier to put in old, push-button phones. Intelligence services can also track people via messengers linked to phones. The intelligence services can make a copy of the SIM card, install the device and log into the user's account. However, two-factor authentication may prevent this. The most reliable messenger is Signal, as one can sign up there without giving a phone number, explains Vital Yakushau, director of cybersecurity company “10Guards”:

"WhatsApp”, “Facebook” - the US intelligence services have access to these messengers. "Viber" and "Telegram" -  very likely that post-Soviet countries have access to them. In Ukraine, we know for a fact that the Ukrainian intelligence services have access to “WhatsApp” because they are in partnership with American intelligence services.

Pavel Latushka, head of the National Anti-Crisis Management, says that he noticed himself being tracked not only after he spoke out against Lukashenka, but also when he worked in the state apparatus:

For example, there was a situation when me and my daughter were in the car together discussing the Belarusian language and I had a report to Lukashenka a day later. Lukashenka asked me how often I speak Belarusian with my daughter. I answered that quite often. He told me that he did not think so and that he spoke to Mikalai more often. From the meaning of the conversation, it was clear that he had received information on the eve of these meetings, recordings of what I could say in the car when I had the phone next to me. The recording took place. Other officials have told me that. Even I was introduced, for example, to a conversation that was printed, a wiretapped conversation between Makei and Korbut. And I was given to read this conversation, which was recorded in a hotel near Hrodna. There was also a situation, when I was talking to my future wife, and she asked me: "Is it true that Darafeeva is Lukashenka's mistress?" To which I replied that I wasn't interested in such matters. I'm not interested in such matters at all. A day later there was a report, I was with Lukashenka face to face and he said to me: "Some people are asking whether Darafeeva is my mistress? Well, I'll tell you, she's not!" In fact, my conversation with my wife was recorded and presented to Lukashenka.

The international human rights organisation “Amnesty International'” noted that under Belarusian law, all telecommunications providers in the country are obliged to ensure that their equipment is compatible with the SORM system. It allows the authorities to directly access all users and related information without informing the provider.

Human rights activists noted that the Belarusian surveillance system does not meet international standards. And the legislation makes it almost impossible for a citizen to find out exactly whether he or she could have been the subject of surveillance.

"Amnesty International" recommended that surveillance in Belarus should only take place if sanctioned and under the supervision of independent judges. According to human rights defenders, prosecutors should not subject people to wiretapping for exercising their rights and active citizenship.

Nadzeya Syadun also had an unusual situation in the café where she worked as a waitress. She says that one day Marya Kalesnikava and Ilya Salei came to the café for lunch. And then probably a member of the security services made an unusual suggestion to the staff:

He came, brought a plate and said: "This plate should be put on the table of a white-haired woman!" He said that this plate should not be washed, but we could wipe it with a damp cloth. We refused. We had two ideas: either it was some kind of poison, or it was a wire. Well, we didn't agree with either option. And so no one put that plate and they left with nothing.

We spoke to former investigator Andrei Astapovich about who monitors the Belarusians. He was forced to leave the country after the elections in Belarus and in Russia he himself became a subject of surveillance:

If you need to monitor for 24 hours, then three, or at least two people are needed. Because someone will fall asleep or something, it's a long and complicated process. These people are very afraid of being exposed. Such officers never appear in the media, nor do they take photos in uniform. It is very vulnerable for them to give themselves away. Roughly speaking, if it comes to the attention of management that an employee has been identified as a police officer, he will be disciplined or have some problems at work. They have a totally secret job. According to internal rules, they have it written all over their databases that they are not police officers.

Thus we learned what human rights activists say: surveillance in Belarus has certain disadvantages. Any Belarusian can be tracked, even if there are no serious criminal grounds for it. But the answer to the question "Can the authorities keep track of all citizens?" - is negative, because it is costly.