Austrian company agrees to supply sanctioned goods to Belarus in conversation with undercover investigators

Apparently, the scheme was already applied by the Belarusian state-owned enterprise Grodno Azot to obtain equipment from the EU, despite restrictions imposed on Minsk for its complicity in Russia's war against Ukraine.

The Belarusian Investigative Center (BIC) prepared this piece in partnership with the Belarusian activist group Rabochy Ruch. 

Operation "Brenity"

— I wanted to raise another topic with you. I understand that this same enterprise [Grodno Azot] has approached me with questions about spare parts, about other equipment. <...> Theoretically, we can also try, that is, if the need arises, to say that it is also for you. And then can you, like, sell to them? — the director of the Austrian company asked, stammering. A Rabochy Rukh representative  contacted him under the guise of a potential client. We sought to determine whether it would be possible to arrange the supply of sanctioned goods to Belarus.

According to cover story, a new company named “Brenity” was to be established in  Belarus’s Brest region to produce polyamide yarn. Its production equipment requires EU-manufactured components that are prohibited from import under sanctions. However, our investigation found that the Belarusian state enterprise Grodno Azot, which operates similar production facilities, was nevertheless able to obtain the same components. The company did so using the same supply route.

The director of the Austrian supplier company openly told that he was ready to sell the prohibited goods using the scheme he had used before. Moreover, he offered “Brenity” to become an intermediary for the delivery of components to the sanctioned Grodno Azot.

The chain of intermediaries

In our previous investigation, “The thread of deception. How Grodno Azot sells polyamide to the EU, bypassing sanctions”, we explained how Belarusian polyamide is used, among other things, in the production of Russian military helmets and bulletproof vests.

In Belarus, the state enterprise Grodno Azot produces polyamide as well as related fibers and yarn. In February 2022, the plant tried to purchase spinnerets – metal parts with tiny holes or nozzles through which molten polymer is pushed to create a filament – from the Austrian company Tetran Beratungs-und Handels Ges.m.b.H (later referred to as Tetran).

However, since 2021, EU and US sanctions have been in force against Grodno Azot. To circumvent the ban, the Belarusian giant turned to the Austrian company through an intermediary, Dziarzaunaje pradpryjemstva Grikom (State Enterprise Grikom). Grikom’s director at the time was Viktar Rusak, the former head of the personnel department at Grodno Azot. [*]

The intermediary sent an inquiry to Tetran. The response arrived in March 2022, after Russia had launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the EU had imposed sanctions on Belarus for being an ally of the aggressor. European companies were prohibited from supplying such equipment not only to Grodno Azot, but to Belarus as a whole. Tetran's owner, Sergej Moliboga, declined to sell the parts. 

However, the wording of his response appeared to leave open the possibility of circumventing the restrictions, stating: "We are forced to inform you that we will not be able to supply goods with tariff code 84482000 through Lithuania and Poland. <...> I ask you to work out other ways to deliver these goods." [*]

Another way was found indeed. A document package from May 2022 provided to the BIC by Rabochy Ruсh shows that Grodno Azot did purchase the spinnerets through intermediaries. The first intermediary was the Turkish company Banss Danişmanlik ve İşaat Diş Ti̇caret Li̇mi̇ted Şi̇rketi̇. 

It purchased the parts from Tetran and resold them to TAA Groniti, a company familiar to our readers from the first part of this investigation. (TAA Groniti is used as an intermediary to supply polyamide to the EU from Khimvolokno Plant, a branch of Grodno Azot. To circumvent sanctions, TAA Groniti is named as the manufacturer in customs documents). [*] [*] [*] Ultimately, TAA Groniti resold the spinnerets to the actual buyer, Grodno Azot. [*]

Undercover Conversation

The Turkish company Banss Danişmanlik ve İşaat Diş Ti̇caret Li̇mi̇ted Şi̇rketi̇ is not a new partner of Grodno Azot. It has been cooperating with the enterprise at least since 2020, purchasing polyamide products from it. [*] When the EU and the US imposed their sanctions in 2021, polyamide supplies to the Turkish company went through TAA Groniti. [*]

Turkey did not impose restrictions on Grodno Azot, and the change in supply routes was probably due to the threat of secondary sanctions from the US.

The actions of the Austrian company Tetran, which sold spinnerets to the Belarusian plant, suggest a possible deliberate breach of sanctions legislation. This conclusion is based on a telephone conversation with the company’s director, Sergej Moliboga. An excerpt from that conversation opens this article.

During the call, the BIC journalist, posing as a prospective client, asked whether Tetran could supply parts for the fictional Belarusian enterprise "Brenity":

— We are just clarifying which suppliers still work with such equipment and what the logistics situation is now, taking into account all the restrictions. Tell me, do you still work with this equipment at all? That is, spinnerets, spindles?

— In principle, yes, you know, here it is, like… A telephone conversation of this kind. <…> — Moliboga replied.

— Okay, so you are still working with it, right? — the journalist clarified.

— Yes, yes, yes. We are working, we are working.

— And, yes, hypothetically, with our country… Through, so to speak…

— Hypothetically — yes. So, write an e-mail, — the director of Tetran confirmed.

During subsequent negotiations, the director of the Austrian company did not raise objections even after the prospective customer stated that the Russian Ministry of Defense would be among its clients: 

— ... You don't need to tell me. Why are you saying such words on a mobile phone? — Moliboga said.

In addition, Moliboga suggested a route through a non-EU country: 

— You will have a contract with Armenia. There is a girl working there, she is going to Belarus, she told me, at the end of December, maybe then you will meet there. … The company is not mine, but I work with it and everything is fine, — the businessman assured.

Armenian route

After talking with the director of the Austrian company, a Rabochy Rukh representative used the same cover story to call the Armenian company, which Moliboga had mentioned as a possible intermediary. А company employee reacted calmly to the words about cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

— The only thing that can make it difficult for us in this is precisely the circumvention of sanctions. If this code [of the goods] is red (from the sanctions list — BIC), we simply will not be able to bring it from Armenia. … We simply will not be able to do it legally. We work legally. ... We don’t have any hidden mechanisms for this, — the interlocutor said.

— Our spinnerets are on the EU sanctions list for supplies to Belarus and Russia. Sergej Mikhailovich [Moliboga] said that he had been transporting such products, — a Rabochy Rukh representative clarified.

The Armenian company employee said that sanctions lists are regularly updated and that any attempt to conceal or alter a product code would result in the goods being seized and a fine being imposed at the first inspection. At the same time, he noted that other options existed, such as selecting a similar product with a code not included on the sanctions list, or purchasing a non-prohibited set containing the restricted component.